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Removal for Cause: Seila Law and the Future of the
CFPB and FHFA
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 2020, the Supreme Court severed the provision of
the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010 (“Dodd-Frank”)1 granting the Director of the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB” or the “Bureau”) for-cause removal
protection.2 The decision, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB3—billed as the
“Constitutional Case of the Year” by the Wall Street Journal 4—largely
settles the debate over the constitutionality of restrictions on the
President’s ability to remove single officers that head executive agencies
in favor of at-will removal power.5 However, other questions remain.
Seila Law has significant implications for other financial
regulatory agencies that merit serious consideration.6 In a case pending
in its upcoming Term, the Court will likely uphold a lower court’s
decision that Director of the Federal Housing Finance Authority
(“FHFA”) is similarly removable at will.7 Seila Law has also given the
President greater control over not only the CFPB, but also U.S. financial
regulatory policy generally, as the decision also heightens the President’s

1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1011,
12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018).
2. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020) (“[W]e find the Director’s
removal protection severable from the other provisions of the Dodd-Frank that establish the
CFPB . . .”).
3. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
4. Editorial Board, Editorial, Constitutional Case of the Year, WALL ST. J. (March 2, 2020,
7:26
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/constitutional-case-of-the-year-11583195178
[https://perma.cc/V6XN-ZGHD].
5. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2211.
6. See Oral Argument at 2:14, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 197), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2019/19-7 [https://perma.cc/ZL85-7QWH] (The late Justice
Ginsburg remarked at oral argument that “this case has . . . an academic quality to it.”).
7. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 563 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc), cert. granted, 141 S.
Ct. 193 (2020) (holding the FHFA Director’s for-cause removal protection violates the
separation of powers).
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influence over the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) and
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”). 8
This Note argues that while Seila Law alters the CFPB’s
structure, the decision leaves the Bureau’s rulemaking and enforcement
powers intact and will trigger a similar fate for the Federal Housing
Finance Agency (“FHFA”). This Note proceeds in seven parts. Part II
describes the CFPB’s creation, structure, and powers.9 Part III examines
the controversy around the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal protection
and explores the early legal challenges to the Bureau’s structure that
ultimately laid the groundwork for the Supreme Court in Seila Law.10
Part IV scrutinizes the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Seila Law.11 Part V
argues that while Seila Law will not impact the CFPB’s current and future
regulatory powers, the decision will likely facilitate a major shift in the
Bureau’s activities under the Biden administration.12 Part VI analyzes
the decision’s effects on the FHFA and the other federal financial
regulatory agencies.13 Finally, Part VII concludes the Note and looks to
the CFPB’s future as an agency led by a Director removable by the
President at will.14
II. BACKGROUND: THE CFPB’S CREATION, STRUCTURE, AND POWERS
The CFPB was created by Dodd-Frank15 in response to calls for
an overhaul of the federal consumer protection laws following the 2008
financial crisis.16 Congress designed the CFPB as an independent
8. Todd Phillips, The Impacts of Seila Law Beyond Consumer Finance, THE FINREG BLOG
(July 9, 2020), https://sites.law.duke.edu/thefinregblog/2020/07/09/the-impacts-of-seila-lawbeyond-consumer-finance/ [https://perma.cc/ZET6-R544].
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. See infra Part VII.
15. The statute refers to the CFPB as the “Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection.”
Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a). Although Dodd-Frank was signed into law by
President Barack Obama on July 21, 2010, the Bureau did not become fully empowered until
July 21, 2011 due to Dodd-Frank’s “transfer date” provision. Dodd-Frank § 1062, 12 U.S.C.
§ 5582; see also Donald C. Lampe & Ryan J. Richardson, The Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau at Five: A Survey of the Bureau’s Activities, 21 N.C. BANKING INST. 85, 86 (2017)
(discussing the “transfer date” provision and the CFPB’s delayed empoyerment).
16. Senator Elizabeth Warren—at the time, a Harvard Law School Professor—was a
prominent voice in support of the creation of a consumer protection agency. See BARACK
OBAMA, A PROMISED LAND 552 (2020) (describing Warren’s advocacy for “a new consumer
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executive agency housed within the Federal Reserve System (“Federal
Reserve”).17 The Bureau receives its funding from a percentage of the
Federal Reserve’s annual operating expenses rather than through
Congressional appropriation.18
Congress tasked the CFPB with
“ensuring that . . . markets for consumer financial products and services
are fair, transparent, and competitive.”19 The CFPB was delegated the
authority to administer eighteen existing federal consumer finance
statutes,20 and was also given enforcement authority over Dodd-Frank’s

finance protection agency meant to bolster the pathwork of spottily enforced state and federal
regulations already in place and to sheild consumers from questionable financial products . .
.”). Her famous 2007 article “Unsafe at Any Rate” called for the agency’s creation to improve
the “regulatory jumble” of federal consumer financial protection laws. Elizabeth Warren,
Unsafe
at
Any
Rate,
DEMOCRACY
J.
(Summer
2007),
https://democracyjournal.org/magazine/5/unsafe-at-any-rate/ [https://perma.cc/87C5-28XR];
see also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 152 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 98
(2008) (“We propose the creation of a single federal regulator—a new Financial Product
Safety Commission or a new consumer credit division within an existing agency (most likely
the [Federal Reserve Board] or FTC)—that will be put in charge of consumer credit
products.”). The Obama administration advocated for a similar solution. See DEPT. OF
TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 55–75 (2009),
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/wsr/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6UCC-JFPF] (proposing “the creation of a single federal agency . . .
dedicated to protecting consumers in the financial products and services markets” and to be
granted rulemaking, enforcement, and supervisory authority).
17. Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (“There is established in the Federal Reserve
System, an independent bureau to be known as the ‘Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection’
. . . . The Bureau shall be considered an Executive agency . . . .”); see also Adam J. Levitin,
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: An Introduction, 32 REV. BANKING & FIN. L.
321, 337 (2013) (“The CFPB was deliberately designed to be a highly independent agency.”).
18. Dodd-Frank § 1017, 12 U.S.C. § 5497(a)(2)(A)(iii) (“[T]he amount that shall be
transferred to the Bureau in each fiscal year shall not exceed a fixed percentage of the total
operating expenses of the Federal Reserve System . . . equal to . . . 12 percent of such expenses
in fiscal year 2013, and in each year thereafter.”). For a general discussion of the CFPB’s
funding arrangement, see Lampe & Richardson, supra note 15, at 92–93 (“By virtue of its
position within the Federal Reserve System, the Bureau is guaranteed an operating budget.”).
19. Dodd-Frank § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a); see also RICHARD CORDRAY, WATCHDOG:
HOW PROTECTING CONSUMERS CAN SAVE OUR FAMILIES, OUR ECONOMY, AND OUR
DEMOCRACY 29 (2020) (“The idea was to create a government agency with a singular mission:
to stand on the side of consumers and ensure they are treated fairly in the financial
marketplace.”).
20. See Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (authorizing the CFPB to “administer,
enforce, and otherwise implement the provisions of Federal consumer financial law”); see
also Dodd-Frank § 1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(12), (14) (enumerating the federal consumer
financial laws to be administered by the CFPB). These federal consumer finance statutes
include the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114 (1970),
except with respect to sections 615(e) and 628 of that Act; the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”), Pub. L. 95-109, 91 Stat. 874 (1977); and the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”),
Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968).
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new prohibition on “any unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts and practices”
(“UDAAP”).21
The CFPB is led by a single Director, appointed to a five-year
term by the President and confirmed by the Senate.22 Congress granted
the Director for-cause removal protection by allowing the President to
remove the Director only “for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or
malfeasance in office.”23 The Director is required to appoint a Deputy
Director24 and has discretion to employ personnel “deemed necessary to
conduct the business of the Bureau.”25
The CFPB possesses substantial rulemaking powers over the
consumer financial services market. 26 Dodd-Frank vests the Bureau with
the authority “to administer, enforce, and otherwise implement . . .
[f]ederal consumer financial law.”27 The Bureau—under the Director’s
command—promulgates rules affecting “covered persons” and “service
providers.”28 “Covered persons” broadly includes “any person that
engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or
service”,29 and Dodd-Frank defines “consumer financial product or

21. Dodd-Frank § 1036, 12 U.S.C. § 5536(a)(1)(B) (“It shall be unlawful for . . . any
covered person or service provider . . . to engage in any unfair deceptive, or abusive act or
practice . . . .”)
22. Dodd-Frank § 1017, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2), (c)(1). The CFPB Director is also a
member of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (“FSOC”). Dodd-Frank § 111, 12
U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1).
23. Dodd-Frank § 1017, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3).
24. Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5)(A). The Deputy Director “shall serve as
acting Director in the absence or unavailability of the Director.” Dodd-Frank § 1011, 12
U.S.C. § 5491(b)(5).
25. Dodd-Frank § 1013, 12 U.S.C. § 5493(a)(1)(A)–(B) (“The Director may fix the number
or, and appoint and direct, all employees of the Bureau” and “is authorized to employ
attorneys, compliance examiners, compliance supervision analysts, economists, statisticians,
and other employees as may be deemed necessary to conduct the business of the Bureau.”).
26. See Dodd-Frank § 1012, 12 U.S.C. § 5492 (“Executive and Administrative Powers.”);
see also Lampe & Richardson, supra note 15, at 95 (“The Dodd-Frank Act vests the CFPB, a
single entity, with broad rulemaking, supervision, and enforcement powers over significant
segments of the consumer financial services market.”).
27. Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(a).
28. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(b) (“The Bureau may prescribe rules applicable
to a covered person or service provider identify as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts
or practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer financial
product or service, or the offering of a consumer financial product or service.”).
29. Dodd-Frank § 1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6)(A). “Covered persons” also includes “any
affiliate” of a “covered person” who “acts as a service provider to such a [covered] person.”
Id. § 5481(6)(B).
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service” in further detail.30 “Service provider” is defined as “any person
that provides a material service to a covered person in connection with
the offering or provision by such covered person of a consumer financial
product or service.”31 These broad statutory definitions facilitate the
CFPB’s issuance of rules prohibiting UDAAP,32 as well as rules requiring
certain individuals and entities to register with the agency33 or requiring
disclosure of certain information to consumers. 34 In short, the CFPB is
vested with rulemaking authority over vast swaths of the American
consumer finance landscape.35
The Bureau’s regulatory power is subject to only a few
limitations.36 The FSOC 37 may stay or set aside, at the request of any of

30. A product is only considered a “consumer financial product or service” if listed as a
“financial product or service” in the statute and if it is “offered or provided for use by
consumers primarily for personal, family, or household purposes.” Id. § 5481(5)(A).
“Financial product or service” is itself defined at length in the statute. Id. § 5481(15). For a
helpful summary of this rather cumbersome definition, see Levitin, supra note 17, at 346
(noting “financial product or service” includes “extensions, servicing, brokerage, and sales of
credit”; “real estate settlement services other than appraisals and insurance”; “deposit taking”;
“check cashing, collection, and guarantee services”; “financial advisory services”; and “debt
collection,” among others). “Financial product or service” does not include insurance
activities or “electronic conduit services.” Dodd-Frank § 1002, § 5481(15)(C).
31. Dodd-Frank § 1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(26)(A). “Service provider” also includes any
person that “participates in designing, operating, or maintaining the consumer financial
product or service” or “ processes transactions relating to the consumer financial product or
service other than unknowingly or incidentally transmitting or processing financial data in a
manner that such data is undifferentiated from other types of data in the same form as the
person transmits or processes.” Id. However, persons who only provide general “support” or
“ministerial services” are excluded from this definition, as are “time or space for an
advertisement for a consumer financial product or service through print, newspaper, or
electronic media.” Id. § 5481(26)(B).
32. See Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2) (authorizing the CFPB to “exercise its
authorities” with respect to UDAAP).
33. See Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512(c)(7) (“The Bureau may prescribe rules
regarding registration requirements applicable to a covered person, other than an insured
depository institution, insured credit union, or related person.”).
34. See Dodd-Frank § 1033, 12 U.S.C. § 5533(a) (requiring a “covered person” to disclose
information “concerning the consumer financial product or service that the consumer obtained
from such covered person”).
35. See Lampe & Richardson, supra note 15, at 102 (“The agency’s organic rulemaking
powers enable the CFPB to prescribe rules, for purposes set forth in Title X [of Dodd-Frank],
that govern nearly all segments of the consumer financial services market.”).
36. See infra nn.36–41.
37. Another creation of Dodd-Frank, the FSOC is tasked with “identify[ing] risks to the
financial stability of the United States” caused by the “financial distress or failure, or ongoing
activities, of large, interconnected bank holding companies or nonbank financial companies,
or that could arise outside the financial services marketplace”; “promot[ing] market
discipline” to eliminate the belief that the federal government will rescue entities deemed too
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its member agencies and after a two-thirds majority vote, any CFPB
rulemaking that the FSOC determines would jeopardize bank “safety and
soundness” or the “stability of the financial system of the United States”
generally.38 CFPB rulemaking is also subject to procedural limitations,
such as the notice-and-comment requirements of the Administrative
Procedure Act (“APA”),39 the cost-benefit analysis requirements of the
Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”),40 and the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (“SBREFA”). 41 Finally,
as with any administrative agency, the CFPB can only promulgate rules
under the framework of its enabling statutes;42 Congress is free to alter
the boundaries of the Bureau’s regulatory authority via legislation.43
The CFPB also possesses supervisory, enforcement, and
adjudicatory powers.44 The Bureau has exclusive authority to supervise,
examine, and enforce regulatory compliance of banks, credit unions, and
big to fail; and “respond[ing] to emerging threats to the stability of the United States financial
system.” Dodd-Frank § 112, 12 U.S.C. § 5322(a)(1).
38. Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5513(a)–(c). A decision by the FSOC to set aside a
CFPB regulation is subject to judicial review. Id. § 5513(c)(8).
39. Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) § 553, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018). Like other
federal government agencies, the CFPB must publish a notice of proposed rulemaking in the
Federal Register and hear public comments before issuing a final rule. Id.
40. Dodd-Frank § 1022, 12 U.S.C § 5512(b)(2)(A)(i) (“In prescribing a rule under the
Federal consumer financial laws, the Bureau shall consider the potential benefits and costs to
consumers and covered persons, including the potential reduction of access by consumers to
consumer financial products or services resulting from such rule.”).
41. Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (“SBREFA”), Pub. L.
No. 104-121, 110 Stat. 847 (1996). Prior to publishing a notice of proposed rulemaking, the
CFPB must convene a review panel (“SBREFA Panel”) consisting of representatives from
the CFPB, the Small Business Administration (“SBA”), and the White House Office of
Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”). 5 U.S.C. § 609(b)(3). The SBREFA Panel is
required to hear testimony from representatives of relevant small business communities about
the potential costs of the CFPB’s proposed rule to such small business communities, then
summarize its findings in a report. Id. § 609(b)(4)–(5). The CFPB must consider this report
and discuss any response in the agency’s notice of proposed rulemaking. Id. § 609(b)(6). The
CFPB, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”), and the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (“OSHA”) are the only three federal agencies subject to this
requirement. Id. § 609(d).
42. See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (“[T]he
degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according to the scope of the power
congressionally conferred.”).
43. For specific provisions that cabin the CFPB’s regulatory authority, see, for example,
Dodd-Frank § 1012, 12 U.S.C. § 5492 (“Executive and Administrative Powers”); Dodd-Frank
§ 1022, 12 U.S.C. § 5512 (“Rulemaking Authority”); and Dodd-Frank §§ 1024–1026, 12
U.S.C. §§ 5514–5516 (supervisory authorities).
44. See generally Dodd-Frank §§ 1031–1097, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531–5538 (“Specific Bureau
Authorities”); see also Dodd-Frank §§ 1051–1057, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5561–5567 (“Enforcement
Powers”).

2021]

SEILA LAW AND THE CFPB

373

their affiliates with total assets of more than $10 billion. 45 The Bureau
also possesses supervisory and enforcement powers over nonbank
entities such as residential mortgage lenders and brokers, payday lenders,
and providers of private education loans.46 To ensure compliance with
its rules and federal consumer protection laws generally, the CFPB may
issue subpoenas47 and civil investigative demands (“CIDs”),48 conduct
administrative proceedings,49 and prosecute violations of its directives in
federal court.50

45. See Dodd-Frank § 1025, 12 U.S.C. § 5515(a)–(b) (“The Bureau shall have exclusive
authority to require reports and conduct examinations on a periodic basis . . . for purposes of
(A) assessing compliance with the requirements of Federal consumer financial laws; (B)
obtaining information about the activities subject to such laws and the associated compliance
systems or procedures of such persons; and (C) detecting and assessing associated risks to
consumers and to markets for consumer financial products and services.”). Banks, credit
unions, and their affiliates with total assets under $10 billion are subject to supervision,
examination, and enforcement by their federal prudential regulator, be it the Federal Reserve
Board of Governors, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, or the National Credit
Union Administration. Dodd-Frank § 1026, 12 U.S.C. § 5516.
46. Dodd-Frank § 1024, 12 U.S.C. § 5514. However, the CFPB has no authority “over a
motor vehicle dealer that is predominantly engaged in the sale and servicing of motor vehicles,
the leasing and servicing of motor vehicles, or both,” unless such a dealer is also involved in
consumer services “related to residential or commercial mortgages of self-financing
transactions involving real property” or, in some circumstances, “extends retail credit or
leases involving motor vehicles.” Dodd-Frank § 1029, 12 U.S.C. § 5519(a)–(b).
47. Dodd-Frank § 1052, 12 U.S.C. § 5562(b).
48. Dodd-Frank § 1052, 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c). The CFPB may issue CIDs to any person
“the Bureau has reason to believe . . . may be in possession, custody, or control of any
documentary material or tangible things, or may have any information, relevant to a violation”
of federal consumer financial law. Id. Through such CIDs, the Bureau may require
production of documents or “tangible things,” written reports or answers, or oral testimony.
Id.
49. Dodd-Frank § 1053, 12 U.S.C. § 5563(a). A CFPB “hearing officer” presides over
these proceedings and issues a “recommended decision,” which is then presented to the
Director who “issue[s] a final decision and order.” Authority of the hearing officer, 12 C.F.R.
§ 1081.104(b) (2018); Recommended decision of the hearing officer, 12 C.F.R. § 1081.400(d)
(2018).
50. Dodd-Frank § 1054, 12 U.S.C. § 5564(a). Through either a court action or
administrative proceeding, the CFPB may seek or award a variety of remedies including
“rescission or reformation of contracts”; “refund of moneys or return of real property”;
“disgorgement or compensation for unjust enrichment”; “limits on the activities or functions
of the person”; and civil money penalties, damage awards, or other monetary relief. DoddFrank § 1055, 12 U.S.C. § 5565(a).
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III. EARLY CONTROVERSY AND LEGAL CHALLENGES
The CFPB’s structure was controversial from its earliest days.51
The Bureau’s architects argued political independence was necessary to
ensure adequate enforcement of consumer protection laws52 in the face of
an existing failed regulatory structure and well-financed industry
opposition to increased regulatory oversight.53 On the other hand, many
congressional Republicans argued Congress had granted the Bureau too
much regulatory power to be wielded by a single director removable only
“for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.” 54 Critics also
pointed to the fact that most of the existing independent federal financial
regulators—including the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (“FDIC”), the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(“CFTC”), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”)—are
overseen by multi-member boards or commissions, and argued the CFPB
Director’s removal protection was excessive insulation of a powerful
executive branch agency. 55 That insulation, however, was a deliberate
51. See Levitin, supra note 17, at 336 (“The CFPB was one of the most controversial and
hard-fought parts of the legislation that became the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010.”).
52. See id. at 329 (“The pre-CFPB consumer financial protection regime had four major
structural flaws: (1) consumer protection was an ‘orphan’ mission that had no regulatory
‘home’ in any single agency; (2) consumer protection was often subordinated to regulatory
concerns about bank profitability; (3) there was a lack of regulatory expertise in consumer
financial issues; and (4) the diffusion of regulatory responsibility created regulatory arbitrage
opportunities that fueled a race to the bottom.”); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating
Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010)
(“What policy makers who seek insultation want to avoid are particular pitfalls of
politicization, such as pressures that prioritize narrow short-term interests at the expense of
long-term public welfare.”).
53. See AMS. FOR FIN. REFORM, PAYDAY PAY-TO-PLAY 2 (2014),
https://ourfinancialsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Payday-pay-to-play-final.pdf,
[https://perma.cc/6GBX-3NFM] (noting that payday lenders and their trade associations
reported over $15 million of political spending in the 2013–2014 election cycle alone).
54. Dodd-Frank § 1017, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3). For example, Senator Richard Shelby (RAL), then-Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, condemned the CFPB as “the most
powerful yet unaccountable bureaucracy in the federal government” and called for (1)
replacing the single Director with a board of directors; (2) subjecting the Bureau to the
congressional appropriations process; and (3) subjecting Bureau action to oversight by the
Fed, FDIC, and OCC. Richard Shelby, The Danger of an Unaccountable “ConsumerProtection”
Czar,
WALL
ST.
J.
(July
21,
2011),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903554904576457931310814462
[https://perma.cc/N3HZ-2N7H].
55. See id. (“Another myth is that the [CFPB] is already more accountable than any other
financial regulator. This is nonsense. The [SEC] is subject to congressional appropriations
and is led by a multi-member panel, as is the [CFTC]. The Federal Reserve and the [FDIC]
are also led by boards.”).
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legislative choice intended to shield the Bureau from partisan control or
industry capture, as well as to deny the President the ability to remove the
Director over policy disagreement.56
After Dodd-Frank was passed on a largely party-line vote57 and
the CFPB began carrying out its statutory mandate, the debate over the
agency’s constitutionality continued throughout the remainder of the
Obama administration and into the 2016 general election. 58 Republicans
regained House majority status alongside President Donald Trump’s
inauguration in 2017 and initiated attempts to reform the CFPB59 and
Dodd-Frank generally, including the proposed Financial CHOICE Act of
2017 (“CHOICE Act”)60 and the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief,
56. See CORDRAY, supra note 19, at 30–31 (“Banking lobbyists did not want the new
agency at all, and they certainly did not want it to have this kind of independence, which
insulates it from the pressures they can exert with their considerable influence over legislative
and executive oversight. . . . As enacted, the Consumer Bureau was designed to be both
independent and strong enough to take on the financial industry on behalf of individual
customers. This was in sharp contrast to the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), a financial
agency that was eliminated by the [Dodd-Frank Act]. . . . The OTS was viewed as a classic
instance of ‘agency capture,’ where some key officials had cozied up so closely to the
companies they were supposed to regulate that they came to share and support their
perspective on the world.”).
57. See Binyamin Appelbaum & David M. Herszenhorn, Financial Overhaul Signals Shift
on
Deregulation,
N.Y.
TIMES
(July
15,
2010),
https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/2010/07/16/business/16regulate.html
[https://perma.cc/39UF-B2D5] (noting Dodd-Frank passed “largely along party lines” with
only three Republican votes in the Senate and House of Representatives each); see also
CORDRAY, supra note 19, at 28 (“Most Democrats pushed for financial reform, while almost
every Republican opposed [Dodd-Frank] as a blatant expansion of government that would
intervene too heavily in the marketplace.”).
58. See COMM. ON ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE 2016 REPUBLICAN NAT’L CONVENTION,
REPUBLICAN
PLATFORM
2016
3
(2016),
https://prod-cdnstatic.gop.com/media/documents/DRAFT_12_FINAL%5B1%5D-ben_1468872234.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8LXP-CN6N] (“The worst of Dodd-Frank is the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau, deliberately designed to be a rogue agency. It answers neither to Congress
nor the executive, has its own guaranteed funding outside the appropriations process, and uses
its slush fund to steer settlements to politically favored groups. Its Director has dictatorial
powers unique in the American Republic. . . . If the Bureau is not abolished, it should be
subjected to congressional appropriations. In that way, consumer protection in the financial
markets can be advanced through measures that are both effective and constitutional.”).
59. See, e.g., Jeb Hensarling, How We’ll Stop a Rogue Federal Agency, WALL ST. J. (Feb.
8, 2017, 6:43 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-well-stop-a-rogue-federal-agency1486597413, [https://perma.cc/T9L5-5YFV] (arguing Congress should “direct the Fed to
terminate CFPB funding” and “transfer the CFPB’s consumer protection role to the Federal
Trade Commission or back to traditional banking regulators”).
60. Financial CHOICE Act of 2018, H.R. 5983, 114th Cong. (2016). Introduced by
Representative Jeb Hensarling (R-TX), the Chairman of the House Financial Services
Committee, the CHOICE Act would have replaced the CFPB with a “Consumer Law
Enforcement Agency” and would have drastically reduced the agency’s regulatory,
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and Consumer Protection Act of 2018 (“EGRRCPA”). 61 EGRRCPA was
signed into law in May 2018,62 and while it largely addressed other
provisions of Dodd-Frank and did not reform the CFPB’s structure or its
Director’s removal protection, EGRRCPA did amend the Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act (“HDMA”) 63 to exempt certain institutions
from CFPB mortgage lending reporting requirements.64
This political sparring over the Bureau’s constitutionality has
been reflected in notable personnel turnover in the CFPB Directorship in
recent years.65 When the CFPB’s first Director, Richard Cordray,
resigned in order to run for Governor of Ohio, President Trump appointed
Mick Mulvaney, then-Director of the Office of Management and Budget
(“OMB”), as “Acting Director” of the Bureau. 66 After an unsuccessful
legal challenge by CFPB Deputy Director Leandra English seeking to
prevent Mulvaney from assuming leadership of the Bureau, 67 Acting
Director Mulvaney ushered in a new era for the CFPB marked by a
examination, and enforcement powers, and would have altered the agency’s leadership and
funding structures. Id. §§ 711–37. The House passed the CHOICE Act in June 2017, but the
Senate declined to act on the bill. See Eric J. Spitler, The Long Game: The Decade-Long
Effort to Dismantle the Dodd-Frank Act, 24 N.C. BANKING INST. 1, 46–69 (2020) (“[T]he
CHOICE Act would have repealed or amended almost every section of the Dodd-Frank Act
had it been enacted into law. . . Without a sixty-vote margin the Senate, and with strong
opposition to the bill by the Democrats in the Senate, there was never any real prospect that
the Senate would take it up.”).
61. Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-174, 132 Stat. 1296 (2018).
62. Id.; see also RICHARD M. ALEXANDER ET AL., ARNOLD & PORTER, PASSAGE OF THE
ECONOMIC GROWTH ACT MODIFIES THE DODD-FRANK ACT AND PROVIDES OTHER FINANCIAL
REGULATORY
RELIEF
(June
1,
2018),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/06/passage-of-theeconomic-growth-act-modifies [https://perma.cc/C96T-ATDK] (noting President Trump
signed the EGRRCPA into law on May 24, 2018).
63. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1124 (1975).
64. See generally Partial Exemptions from the Requirements of the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act Under the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection
Act
(Regulation
C),
83
Fed.
Reg.
45325
(Sept.
7,
2018),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2018-09-07/pdf/2018-19244.pdf
[https://perma.cc/EW5A-X4Z4] (clarifying the partial exemptions from HDMA reporting
requirements for certain insured depository institutions and insured credit unions).
65. See Katie Rodgers, 2 Bosses Show Up to Lead the Consumer Financial Protection
Bureau, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/27/us/politics/cfpbleandra-english-mulvaney.html [https://perma.cc/5X67-KQA7] (chronicling the change in
CFPB leadership following Director Cordray’s resignation).
66. Id.
67. See English v. Trump, 279 F. Supp. 3d. 307, 311–12 (D.D.C. 2018) (denying Deputy
Director English’s request for a temporary restraining order to prevent the President from
designating Mulvaney to serve as acting Director of the CFPB).
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notably less aggressive approach to the agency’s regulatory mandate.68
After Mulvaney left his position as Acting Director to become President
Trump’s Acting Chief of Staff in December 2018,69 Trump appointed
Kathleen Kraninger to be the CFPB’s second Director.70 Director
Kraninger led the Bureau for the remainder of Trump’s term until she was
asked to resign by President Biden on his first day in office.71
In addition to political sparring over the CFPB’s independence,
the Bureau faced many legal challenges to its Director’s for-cause
removal protection before the Supreme Court finally condemned the
structure in Seila Law.72 Parties facing enforcement actions or penalties
levied by the CFPB often sought relief in federal court, arguing the CFPB
was unconstitutionally structured and thus had no authority to impose
fines or enforce consumer protection laws. 73 However, no plaintiff had
68. See CORDRAY, supra note 19, at 206 (“Mulvaney ultimately stayed about a year, mainly
focusing on public relations stunts. But during his time, he adopted a philosophy of
government inaction to slow the pace of enforcement and regulation, declaring that the bureau
would no longer ‘push the envelope’ to protect consumers.”). Cordray also asserts that after
Mulvaney assumed leadership of the CFPB, “several existing investigations were closed, and
some cases were dropped. Id. Others were completed but produced what appeared to be more
lenient results and less money back for consumers, which some observers dubbed the
‘Mulvaney discount.’” Id. See also Nicholas Confessore, Mick Mulvaney’s Master Class in
Destroying a Bureaucracy from Within, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 16, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/16/magazine/consumer-financial-protection-bureautrump.html [https://perma.cc/2M9C-EYPU] (chronicling the dramatically less-rigorous
enforcement of consumer protection regulations under Mulvaney’s leadership than under
Director Cordray).
69. Michael Tackett & Maggie Haberman, Trump Names Mick Mulvaney Acting Chief of
Staff, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/14/us/politics/mickmulvaney-trump-chief-of-staff.html [https://perma.cc/B8W9-BX23].
70. Katy O’Donnell, Senate Confirms Trump Nominee Kraninger to Lead Consumer
Bureau,
POLITICO
(Dec.
6,
2018,
2:42
PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2018/12/06/senate-confirms-kraninger-cfpb-1006095
[https://perma.cc/5PED-9JAX].
71. See Jesse Hamilton, Trump Consumer Watchdog Kraninger Steps Down at Biden’s
Request,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
20,
2021,
2:06
PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-01-20/trump-consumer-watchdogkraninger-steps-down-at-biden-s-request [https://perma.cc/435X-7D9D] (reporting that
Director Kraninger resigned from her position “according to the wishes of President Joe
Biden”).
72. See infra n.73.
73. See generally Morgan Drexen, Inc. v. CFPB, 979 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.D.C. Cir. 2013)
(seeking injunctive relief against CFPB civil investigative demand); State Nat. Bank of Big
Spring v. Lew, 958 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D.D.C. 2013) (arguing against the Bureau’s
constitutionality); CFPB v. Morgan Drexen, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1082 (C.D. Cal. 2014)
(challenging a CFPB complaint on separation-of-powers grounds); CFPB v. Future Income
Payments, LLC, 252 F. Supp. 3d 961 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (challenging CFPB civil investigative
demand on separation-of-powers grounds).
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succeeded on such a claim until 2016 in PHH Corp. v. CFPB.74 In that
case, PHH Corporation (“PHH”), a large home mortgage lender, was
ordered to disgorge $6.5 million in profits after a CFPB administrative
law judge determined PHH had violated the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act (“RESPA”) by accepting kickbacks from mortgage
insurers.75 However, then-CFPB Director Richard Cordray overturned
the administrative judge’s determination on statutory interpretation
grounds and increased PHH’s disgorgement to $109 million.76 In a
majority opinion written by then-Judge Kavanaugh, the D.C. Circuit
found the Director’s for-cause removal protection an unconstitutional
separation-of-powers violation and severed the provision from DoddFrank. 77 However, the D.C. Circuit later reviewed the case en banc and
reversed, holding the Director’s for-cause removal protection was
constitutional;78 the reversal elicited a strong dissent from Judge
Kavanaugh that foreshadowed his vote in the Supreme Court’s Seila Law
decision.79

74. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 839 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2016), rev’d en banc, 881 F.3d 75 (D.C.
Cir. 2018).
75. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 11–12.
76. Id.; see also CORDRAY, supra note 19, at 182 (referring to PHH Corp. as “an usually
complex case with a tortured history” and to the disputed statutory interpretation issues as a
“constellation of uncertainties [that] created a perfect storm of controversy surrounding the
case”).
77. PHH Corp., 839 F.3d at 39.
78. PHH Corp. v. CFPB, 881 F.3d 75, 77 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (en banc).
79. See id. at 165–66, (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“No independent agency exercising
substantial executive authority has ever been headed by a single person. Until now. . . .
.Beacuse the CFPB is an independent agency headed by a single Director and not by a multimember commission, the Director of the CFPB possesses more unilateral authority—that is,
authority to take action on one’s own, subject to no check—than any single commissioner or
board member in any other independent agency in the U.S. government. Indeed, other than
the President, the Director enjoyes more unilateral authority than any other official in any of
the three branches of government. That combination—power that is massive in scope,
concentrated in a single person, and unaccountable to the President—triggers the important
constitutional question at issue in this case.”). Some federal courts subsequently agreed with
Judge Kavanaugh and rejected the en banc D.C. Circuit’s reasoning in PHH Corp. See, e.g.,
CFPB v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, 332 F. Supp. 3d 729, 784 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding the
CFPB’s single-director structure unconstitutional). But see CFPB v. All Am. Check Cashing,
No. 3:16-cv-356-WHB-JCG, 2018 WL 9812125, at *2 (S.D. Miss. March 21, 2018) (“For the
same reasons stated in PHH Corp., this Court . . . finds that the Bureau is not unconstitutional
based on its single-director structure.”).
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IV. SEILA LAW V. CFPB
A.

Facts and Procedural History

Seila Law, LLC (“Seila Law”) is a law firm located near Los
Angeles, California, that operates a debt services practice.80 On February
27, 2017, the CFPB issued a Civil Investigative Demand (“CID” or the
“Demand”)81 to Seila Law to determine whether the firm was “engaging
in unlawful acts or practices in the advertising, marketing, or sale of debt
relief services or products.”82 The Demand ordered Seila Law to provide
the CFPB with documents and information related to its debt relief
business practices. 83 After the CFPB rejected a request by Seila Law to
set aside this Demand, Seila Law refused to comply, and the CFPB filed
a district court petition seeking the assistance of the court in enforcing the
Demand.84 The District Court rejected Seila Law’s argument that the
CFPB Director’s removal protection was unconstitutional and ordered
the firm to produce the requested documents and information. 85 The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the demand was enforceable, agreeing with the
lower court—and the en banc D.C. Circuit in PHH Corp.—that the CFPB
Director’s removal protection did not violate the constitution.86
After the Ninth Circuit’s decision, Director Kraninger notified
80. Seila Law’s website describes the firm as a “consumer advocacy law practice” and lists
“debt resolution” as a practice area.
Practice Area, SEILA LAW LLC,
http://seilalawfirm.com/practices.html [https://perma.cc/WRJ8-LC8Y] (last visited Feb. 6,
2021).
81. The CFPB is authorized to issue CIDs to persons who “may have any information[]
relevant to a violation” of any law within the CFPB’s enforcement purview. Dodd-Frank §
1052, 12 U.S.C. § 5562(c)(1).
82. CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, No. 8:17-cv-01081, 2017 WL 6536586, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
25, 2017), aff’d 923 F.3d 680 (9th Cir. 2019), rev’d 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). The CFPB sought
this information to determine whether Seila Law had violated “Sections 1031 and 1036 of the
Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531, 5536, 12 U.S.C. § 5481 et
seq.; the Telemarketing Sales Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 310.1 et seq.; or any other Federal consumer
financial law.” Id.
83. Id.
84. Petition to Enforce Civ. Investigative Demand, CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, No. 8:17-cv01081, 2017 WL 6536586, (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017).
85. Seila Law, 2017 WL 6536586, at *6.
86. CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680, 682–84 (9th Cir. 2019), aff’g 2017 WL
6536586 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 25, 2017), rev’d 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020). The Ninth Circuit noted
“[t]he arguments for and against [the constitutionality of the CFPB Director’s for-cause
removal protection] have been thoroughly canvassed in the majority, concurring, and
dissenting opinions in [the D.C. Circuit’s PHH Corp. decision],” and saw “no need to re-play
the same ground here.” Id. at 682 (internal citations omitted). The Court also found
Humphrey’s Executor and Morrison “controlling,” noting that “[t]he Supreme Court is of
course free to revisit those precedents, but we are not.” Id. at 684.
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congressional leaders that the CFPB now viewed the Director’s for-cause
removal protection as unconstitutional,87 a reversal from its position in
the lower courts.88 Thus, after the Supreme Court granted certiorari, the
Solicitor General argued on the Bureau’s behalf against the
constitutionality of the CFPB Director’s removal protection. 89 The
Court, in turn, appointed Paul D. Clement as amicus curiae to represent
the Director’s for-cause removal protection and the Ninth Circuit’s
holding before the Court.90
B.

Holding and Majority’s Reasoning

The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision, holding
“the CFPB’s leadership by a single individual removeable only for
inefficiency, neglect, or malfeasance violates the separation of powers.”91
Furthermore, the Court found this unconstitutional provision severable
from the rest of Dodd-Frank.92 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for the
majority, joined by Justices Thomas, Alito, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh,
with regards to the unconstitutionality of the CFPB Director’s for-cause
removal protection.93 However, Justice Thomas also filed a concurrence,
joined by Justice Gorsuch, that dissented from the Chief Justice’s
87. See Letter from Kathleen L. Kraninger, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, to Mitch
McConnell,
Maj.
Leader,
U.S.
Senate
1
(Sept.
17,
2019),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/14/2019/09/McConnell-letter.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U7A2-PB9G]
(noting the CFPB “has determined that the for-cause removal provision . . . is
unconstitutional”); see also Letter from Kathleen L. Kraninger, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot.
Bureau, to Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives 1 (Sept. 17, 2019),
https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/14/2019/09/Pelosiletter.pdf [https://perma.cc/4KR9-G99U] (noting that the CFPB had determined the
Director’s removal protection unconstitutional).
88. See Brief of Appellee CFPB at 11, CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680 (9th Cir.
2019) (No. 17-56324), 2018 WL 1511440, at *21 (“The [CFPB Director’s] limited removal
restriction that Seila Law challenges is constitutional under controlling Supreme Court
precedent because it does not impede the President’s ability to take care that the laws are
faithfully executed.”).
89. See Brief for Respondent Supporting Vacatur at 8, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct.
2183 (2020) (No. 19-7), 2019 WL 6727094, at *18 (“Because the statutory restriction on the
President’s authority to remove the Bureau’s Director is unconstitutional, it should be
invalidated.”).
90. Brief for Court Appointed Amicus Curiae in Support of Judgement Below, Seila Law
LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-7), 2020 WL 353477.
91. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2197 (2020).
92. Id. at 2211.
93. See id. at 2191–2211 (majority opinion).
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severability analysis.94 Justice Kagan filed a dissent, joined by Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.95
After accepting that “lesser executive officers” are necessary to
assist the President in faithfully executing his or her Article II powers,
Roberts asserted that such officers “must remain accountable to the
President, whose authority they wield.”96 Echoing a long line of
precedent from Myers v. United States97 through Free Enterprise Fund v.
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,98 the Chief Justice
reasoned that the President’s removal power—although not explicitly
granted by the Constitution—is necessary to ensure this accountability.99
After Seila Law, only two exceptions to the general rule that the
President possesses unrestricted removal power remain—“one for
multimember expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive
power, and one for inferior officers with limited duties and no
policymaking or administrative authority.”100 The first exception flows
from Humphrey’s Executor v. United States,101 where the Court upheld
a statutory removal protection for FTC Commissioners that allowed the
94. See id. at 2211–24 (Thomas, J., concurring) (arguing the Court should deny the CFPB’s
petion to enforce the CID rather than reach the severability issue).
95. See id. at 2224–45 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (arguing the Director’s for-cause removal
protection was not a violation of separation-of-powers doctrine but concurring in the Court’s
judgment with respect to severability).
96. Id. at 2197.
97. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–64 (1926) (holding the Constitution
grants the President “general administrative control of those executing the laws, including the
power of appointment and removal of executive officers”).
98. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010). Congress
created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (“PCAOB”) via the SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 in response to “celebrated accounting debacles” such as the Enron
accounting scandal. Id. at 486. The PCAOB is vested with regulatory and enforcement
powers over the accounting industry, with this authority “subject to . . . approval and
alteration” by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC” or “Commission”). Id. at
485. As initially designed, the PCAOB was led by a board composed of five members, each
appointed to staggered 5-year terms by the SEC. Id. However, the SEC could only remove
a PCAOB member “for good cause shown.” Id. The Court held that “the dual for-cause
limitations on the removal of Board members contravene the Constitution’s separation of
powers.” Id. at 492. In a majority opinion written by Justice Roberts, the Court reasoned:
“Without a layer of insulation between the Commission and the Board, the Commission could
remove a Board member at any time, and therefore would be fully responsible for what the
Board does. The President could then hold the Commission to account for its supervision of
the Board, to the same extent that he may hold the Commission to account everything else it
does.” Id. at 495–96.
99. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2197–2200.
100. Id. at 2199–2200.
101. Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
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President to remove a Commissioner only for “inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office”—a removal protection identical to DoddFrank’s for-cause removal protection for the CFPB Director. 102 While
reaffirming the President’s removal power over executive officers, the
Humphrey’s Executor Court found that the nature of the FTC
Commissioners’ duties made those officers non-executive and thus
outside the scope of the President’s unfettered removal authority. 103 The
second exception applies to inferior executive officers104 and stems from
Morrison v. Olson,105 where the Court upheld for-cause removal
protection for an independent counsel appointed by the Attorney General,
reasoning that such a restriction on the President’s power to remove
inferior executive officers did not “impede the President’s ability to
perform his constitutional duty.”106
According to Roberts, the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal
protection did not fall under either of the two exceptions to unrestricted
Presidential removal power.107 Unlike the FTC in Humphrey’s Executor,
the CFPB is led not by a multi-member, non-partisan board, but rather by
a single Director who is “hardly a mere legislative or judicial aid.”108 The
102. Id. at 620; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) § 1017, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (“The President may remove the Director for
inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”).
103. Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 632. However, the Humphrey’s Executor Court
admitted the decision left “for future consideration” a “field of doubt” as to the precise line
between a purely-executive and non-executive officer. Id. Justice Roberts summarized the
decision as follows: “Humphrey’s Executor permitted Congress to give for-cause removal
protections to a multimember body of experts, balanced along partisan lines, that performed
legislative and judicial functions and was said not to exercise any executive power.” Seila
Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2199.
104. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2199. Article II distinguishes between principal officers—
required to be appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate—and inferior officers
“whose appointment Congress may vest in the President, courts, or heads of Departments.”
Id. at 2199, n.3 (citing U.S. CONST. art. II. § 2, cl. 2).
105. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
106. Id. at 691. In a lone dissent that somewhat foreshadows the Court’s reasoning in Free
Enterprise Fund and Seila Law, Justice Scalia rejected the Morrison majority’s holding that
Congress can prevent the President from removing an inferior executive officer. Id. at 735
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision on the basic issue of fragmentation of executive
power is ungoverned by rule, and hence ungoverned by law. . . . [I]t fails to explain why it is
not true that—as the text of the Constitution seems to require, and as our past cases have
uniformly assumed—all purely executive power must be under the control of the President.”
(citation omitted)).
107. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2200–01.
108. Id. at 2200. Justice Roberts described the CFPB Director as follows: “Instead of
making reports and recommendations to Congress, as the 1935 FTC did, the Director
possesses the authority to promulgate binding rules fleshing out 19 federal statutes, including
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CFPB Director is outside the scope of the Morrison exception as well
because Dodd-Frank mandates that the Director be appointed by the
President and confirmed by the Senate, 109 making the Director a
principal—not inferior—executive officer. 110 Therefore, the Court
determined the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal protection was
“incompatible with our constitutional structure.”111
After determining that neither exception to the President’s
unrestricted removal power applied, the Court explained that the CFPB’s
single-director structure violated the Constitution’s separation of powers
“by vesting significant governmental power in the hands of a single
individual accountable to no one.”112 Roberts explained further:
The Director is neither elected by the people nor
meaningfully controlled (through the threat of removal)
by someone who is. The Director does not even depend
on Congress for annual appropriations. . . . Yet the
Director may unilaterally, without meaningful
supervision,
issue
final
regulations,
oversee
adjudications, set enforcement priorities, initiate
prosecutions, and determine what penalties to impose on
private parties. With no colleagues to persuade, and no
boss or electorate looking over her shoulder, the Director
may dictate and enforce policy for a vital segment of the
economy affecting millions of Americans.113
Because the Director is appointed to a five-year term, it was possible that
a single-term President would be denied any opportunity to appoint a

a broad prohibition on unfair and deceptive practices in a major segment of the U.S. economy.
And instead of submitting recommended dispositions to an Article III court, the Director may
unilaterally issue final decisions awarding legal and equitable relief in administrative
adjudications. Finally, the Director’s enforcement authority includes the power to seek
daunting monetary penalties against private parties on behalf of the United States in federal
court—a quintessentially executive power not considered in Humphrey’s Executor.” Id.
109. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §
1011, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(2).
110. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2200.
111. Id. at 2201.
112. Id. at 2203.
113. Id. at 2204.
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CFPB Director under the original provision.114 The Court found this
problem was exacerbated by the CFPB’s funding arrangement. 115 The
President can normally exert at least some measure of control over
independent agencies via checks on the congressional appropriations
process such as the veto power. 116 However, the President was deprived
of this control over the CFPB because the Bureau is funded by the Federal
Reserve, which is itself not funded via congressional appropriation. 117
Thus, the CFPB’s “financial freedom makes it even more likely that the
agency will ‘slip from the Executive’s control, and thus from that of the
people.’”118
After finding the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal protection
unconstitutional, the Court determined the provision was severable from
Dodd-Frank.119 However, the Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit to
decide the question of whether the CFPB’s civil investigative demand
issued to Seila Law while the Bureau was unconstitutionally structured
was sufficiently ratified to be legally enforceable.120

114. Id. Roberts offered this hypothetical: “A President elected in 2020 would likely not
appoint a CFPB Director until 2023, and a President elected in 2028 may never appoint one.
That means an unlucky President might get elected on a consumer-protection platform and
enter office only to find herself saddled with a holdover Director from a competing political
party who is dead set against that agenda. To make matters worse, the agency’s singleDirector structure means the President will not have the opportunity to appoint any other
leaders—such as a chair or fellow members of a Commission or Board—who can serve as a
check on the Director’s authority and help bring the agency in line with the President’s
preferred policies.” Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. (quoting Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 499
(2010)).
119. Id. at 2207–11. Dodd-Frank’s express severability clause states: “If any provision of
this Act, an amendment made by this Act, or the application of such provision or amendment
to any person or circumstance is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of this Act, the
amendments made by this Act, and the application of the provisions of such to any person or
circumstance shall not be affected thereby.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 3, 12 U.S.C. § 5302.
120. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2211.
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V. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE CFPB GOING FORWARD
A.

Seila Law Affirms the Constitutionality of the CFPB

The Court’s holding in Seila Law was certainly a victory for the
CFPB’s critics who have argued since the agency’s creation that the
Director’s for-cause removal protection was unconstitutional.121
However, rather than deliver a fatal blow to the agency, the decision
actually validates the constitutionality of the Bureau’s existence and its
regulatory powers generally.122 Indeed, the Court specifically held that
the Bureau “may continue to exist and operate notwithstanding Congress’
unconstitutional attempt to insulate the agency’s Director from removal
by the President.”123 Supporters of the CFPB pointed to this language
immediately after the Court’s decision was issued as support for the
notion that constitutional attacks to the CFPB’s statutory mandate and
existence generally are now foreclosed. 124
B.

CFPB Ratification

The Court remanded to the Ninth Circuit to determine the
ratification issue; however, the CFPB’s rules and regulations issued while
the Bureau was unconstitutionally structured remain in full effect. 125
Shortly after the Court issued its Seila Law decision, Director Kraninger
121. See, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Twenty-Seven Members of the U.S. House of
Representatives in Support of Petitioner, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020)
(No. 19-7), 2019 WL 6875540 (Republican members of Congress including Kevin McCarthy,
Patrick McHenry, and Stephen Scalise argued the Director’s for-cause removal protection
was unconstitutional.); see also Amicus Brief of U.S. Senators Mike Lee et al. Supporting
Petitioner, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-7), 2019 WL 7168613
(Republican Senators Mike Lee, James Lankford, and M. Michael Rounds also argued against
the constitutionality of the CFPB Director’s for-cause removal protection.).
122. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2209 (“The only constitutional defect we have identified in
the CFPB’s structure is the Director’s insulation from removal. If the Director were
removable at will by the President, the constitutional violation would disappear.”).
123. Id. at 2207–08.
124. See Elizabeth Warren (@SenWarren), TWITTER (June 29, 2020, 11:05 AM),
https://twitter.com/SenWarren/status/1277619172042846208
[https://perma.cc/PW2AD4V9] (“Let’s not lose sight of the bigger picture: after years of industry attacks and GOP
opposition, a conservative Supreme Court recognized what we all knew: the @CFPB itself
and the law that created it is constitutional. The CFPB is here to stay.”); see also Richard
Cordray, Why the CFPB’s Loss at the Supreme Court Is Really a Win, WASH. POST (June 29,
2020, 6:20 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/06/29/why-cfpbs-losssupreme-court-is-really-win/ [https://perma.cc/XQ47-AYUW] (describing the decision as “a
sheep that comes in wolf’s clothing”).
125. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2211.

386

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

issued a “Ratification of Bureau Actions” (“Ratification Notice”)
purporting to ratify nearly all regulatory actions the CFPB took from
January 4, 2012 to June 30, 2020.126 This Ratification Notice was an
attempt to protect “existing reliance interests by avoiding doubt as to the
validity of the actions following the Court’s decision in Seila Law”127 and
predictably succeeded in that goal based on the Ninth Circuit’s previous
ruling on a similar CFPB ratification issue in CFPB v. Gordon.128 That
case arose after President Obama installed Richard Cordray as the first
CFPB Director via recess appointment in January 2012, and the Supreme
Court determined in NLRB v. Noel Canning129 that such a recess
appointment was unconstitutional.130 Director Cordray was reappointed
by the President and confirmed by the Senate in July 2013, then issued a
“Notice of Ratification” (“Cordray Ratification”) that purported to ratify
all actions taken while Cordray was Director but before he had been
approved by the Senate. 131 Afterwards, an attorney subject to a Bureau
enforcement action challenged the action on grounds that it had not been
validly ratified, but the Ninth Circuit held the Cordray Ratification
adequately validated all of the Bureau’s regulatory actions while Cordray

126. Ratification of Bureau Actions, 85 Fed. Reg. 41330 (July 7, 2020). All CFPB rules
and regulations published in the Federal Register covered by this ratification, with only two
exceptions: Arbitration Agreements, 82 Fed. Reg. 33210 (July 19, 2017), and Payday,
Vehicle, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 54472 (Nov. 17, 2017). The
first exception—Arbitration Agreements—was invalidated by a joint resolution of Congress
and the President prior to the rule’s compliance date. Pub. L. No. 115–74, 131 Stat. 1243
(2017). The validity of the second excepted rule—Payday, Vehicle, and Certain High-Cost
Installment Loans—is currently being litigated and its compliance date has been stayed.
Order, Cmty. Fin. Servs. Ass’n of Am., Ltd. v. CFPB, No. 1:18-cv-00295 (W.D. Tex. Nov.
6, 2018). The CFPB “has revoked the mandatory underwriting provisions” and “separately
ratified the payment provisions” of that rule. 85 Fed. Reg. 41331. The Ratification Notice
contains a severability clause: “In the event that the Bureau’s ratifying of any individual
Ratified Action or the application of this ratification to any person or circumstance is held to
be invalid for any reason, the remainder of this ratification is severable and shall continue in
force.” 85 Fed. Reg. 41330.
127. Director Kraninger’s decision to ratify was “reinforced by the fact that, based on the
Bureau’s experience as a regulator of markets for consumer financial products and services,
the Director is acutely aware that many of the Ratified Actions have engendered significant
reliance interests. Consumers, the business community, State and local governments, and
other individuals and entities have all relied upon the validity of the Ratified Actions in
organizing their activities.” Ratification of Bureau Actions, 85 Fed. Reg. at 41330.
128. CFPB v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179, 1198 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding the CFPB Director
validly ratified all actions taken before being confirmed to the position by the Senate).
129. NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513 (2014).
130. Id. at 519.
131. Notice of Ratification, 78 Fed. Reg. 53734 (Aug. 30, 2013).
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was unconstitutionally seated.132 Given that Seila Law was remanded to
the Ninth Circuit to decide a similar ratification issue—and that the Ninth
Circuit sitting en banc originally found no issue with the CFPB Director’s
for-cause removal protection—it was highly likely that the CFPB’s
regulations would remain fully intact.133 As expected, the Ninth Circuit
found that the Ratification Notice issued by Director Kraninger in the
wake of the Seila Law decision sufficiently ratified all covered Bureau
actions, allowing all existing CFPB rules and regulations to remain in
force. 134
The Ninth Circuit was also tasked with determining “whether the
civil investigative demand was validly ratified” and thus enforceable
against Seila Law LLC.135 The CFPB’s Ratification Notice did not
explicitly ratify pending enforcement actions; the Bureau instead chose
to “mak[e] such ratifications separately” as appropriate136 and argued it
had already done so twice for the CID issued to Seila Law LLC. 137
Although the CID was originally issued by Director Cordray in early
2017—while Director Cordray was unconstitutionally insulated from
Presidential removal—Acting Director Mick Mulvaney issued a
“Decision Memorandum” (“Mulvaney Ratification”) on March 16, 2018,
formally ratifying the Bureau’s enforcement action against Seila Law
LLC.138 Director Kraninger issued a similar ratification (“Kraninger

132. Gordon, 819 F.3d at 1192 (“Because the CFPB had the authority to bring the action
at the time Gordon was charged, Cordray’s August 2013 Ratification, done after he was
properly appointed as Director, resolved any Appointments Clause deficiencies.”).
133. See CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 923 F.3d 680, 682–84 (9th Cir. 2019) (holding the CFPB
Director’s for-cause removal did not violate the separation of powers).
134. See CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d 715, 719 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding the CID was
validly ratified and thus enforceable against Seila Law because “[j]ust as in Gordon, the
constitutional infirmity relates to the Director alone, not to the legality of the agency itself”).
135. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020). The Court declined to address
the ratification issue because “[t]hat debate turns on case-specific factual and legal questions
not addressed below and not briefed here.” Id. at 2208.
136. Ratification of Bureau Actions, 85 Fed. Reg. 41330, 41330 (July 10, 2020).
137. Supplemental Brief of Appellee Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau at 12, CFPB v. Seila
Law, LLC, 984 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Seila Law has received exactly what it claimed
was lacking, and received it twice: Two officials who were indisputably accountable to the
President have confirmed that this case should proceed.”).
138. Appellee Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau Correspondence Regarding Ratification at 8,
CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2020). The Mulvaney Ratification states: “I
ratify the Bureau’s earlier decisions to issue the February 27, 2017, civil investigate demand
(CID) to Seila Law, LLC; to deny Seila Law’s request to set aside the CID in an order dated
April 10, 2017; and to file a petition on June 22, 2017 requesting the district court enforce the
CID.” Id.

388

NORTH CAROLINA BANKING INSTITUTE

[Vol. 25

Ratification”) on July 9, 2020, shortly after Seila Law was decided.139
The Mulvaney and Kraninger Ratifications were issued while both
Mulvaney (as an Acting Director) and Kraninger (as a post-Seila Law
Director) were removable by the President at will.140 Thus, because the
issuance of the CID was within the CFPB’s enumerated powers and
because it was ratified twice by Directors removable by the President at
will, the Ninth Circuit found Seila Law had no effect on pending CFPB
enforcement actions after they were found to be validly ratified by
Director Kraninger. 141
C.

CFPB Director Under the Biden Administration

In a swift exercise of the President’s new unrestricted power to
remove the CFPB Director at will, even for political reasons alone,142
President Joseph Biden removed Director Kraninger within hours of his
inauguration on January 20, 2021.143 Biden then named David Uejio,
formerly the CFPB’s Chief Strategy Officer, as Acting Director of the
Bureau,144 and is expected to nominate FTC Commissioner Rohit Chopra
to serve as Director Kraninger’s permanent replacement.145 While these

139. Id. at 7. Director Kraninger’s ratification states: “I hereby ratify the decisions to issue
the civil investigative demand to Seila Law, to deny Seila Law’s request to modify or set aside
the CID, and to file a petition requesting that the district court enforce the CID.” Id.
140. Supplemental Brief of Appellee Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau at 14, CFPB v. Seila Law
LLC, 984 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2020); Supplemental Brief of Respondent-Appellant Seila Law,
LLC at 8, CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2020).
141. CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 2020).
142. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020).
143. See Hamilton, supra note 71 (reporting that Director Kraninger resigned from her
position “according to the wishes of President Joe Biden”); see also Kathleen Kraninger
(@CFPBKraninger),
TWITTER
(Jan.
20,
2021,
12:46
PM),
https://twitter.com/CFPBKraninger/status/1351949184883163138?s=20
[https://perma.cc/H5XU-MEW7] (“As requested by the Biden administration, today I
resigned as Director of the CFPB.”).
144. See Kate Berry, Former Cordray Aide Selected for Interim CFPB Post, AM. BANKER
(Jan. 22, 2021, 2:18 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/former-cordray-aideselected-for-interim-cfpb-post [https://perma.cc/7S4T-UCN4] (noting Ueijo “worked for five
years as chief strategy officer and briefly as chief of staff to former CFPB Director Richard
Cordray”).
145. See Andrew Ackerman & Andrew Restuccia, Biden to Pick Rohit Chopra to Lead
Consumer-Finance Agency, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 18, 2021, 11:24 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-expected-to-nominate-rohit-chopra-to-head-consumerfinancial-protection-bureau-11610933184
[https://perma.cc/P8NX-53NC]
(reporting
President Biden’s intentions to nominate Chopra, the CFPB’s student-loan ombudsman
during the Obama administration).
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moves were not unexpected,146 the speed with which President Biden
acted in deposing Director Kraninger is a stark illustration of the
unfettered removal authority sanctioned by the Court in Seila Law.147
The Obama and Trump administrations differered greatly in their
approaches towards the CFPB’s regulatory and enforcement activities,
and the Biden administration could alter the Bureau’s activities yet
again.148 For example, the CFPB announced fifty-five public law
enforcement actions in 2015, compared to just eleven in 2018149 and
twenty-two in 2019.150 Moreover, the Bureau awarded an average of
$59.6 million in relief per case under Director Cordray, compared to an
average of $2.4 million per case under Director Kraninger—a decline of
approximately 96% in average monetary relief awarded per enforcement
action.151 Levels of CFPB enforcement of regulations relating to
mortgage lending, student loans, and deceptive or abusive practices all

146. See, e.g., Robert Schmidt & Jesse Hamilton, Wall Street Frets Over a Revived CFPB
Trump
Left
Toothless,
BLOOMBERG
(Dec.
8,
2020,
2:00
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-08/wall-street-frets-over-a-revival-ofcfpb-left-toothless-by-trump [https://perma.cc/GX42-VWBM] (“The banking industry has
reason to fear that a new chief will return the agency to its days of meting out stiff sanctions
on lenders and credit card companies.”); see also Chris Arnold, Financial Watchdog Expected
To Get Its Teeth Back Under Biden, NPR (Nov. 18, 2020, 6:01 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/18/935470357/financial-watchdog-expected-to-get-its-teethback-under-biden [https://perma.cc/KCM6-B6AD] (discussing how the CFPB could increase
enforcement activity under a Director nominated by President Biden).
147. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020); see also Editorial Board,
Editorial, Biden Learns to Love Brett Kavanaugh, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 21, 2021, 6:50 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/biden-learns-to-love-brett-kavanaugh11611273011?mod=hp_opin_pos_3 [https://perma.cc/Z8C9-P7SB] (arguing Biden’s actions
show that “Democrats are finally appreciating Justice Brett Kavanaugh and the unitary
executive”).
148. See Tory Newmyer, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Muzzled Under Trump,
Prepares to Renew Tough Industry Oversight, WASH. POST (Jan. 27, 2021, 6:00 AM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2021/01/27/cfpb-rohit-chopra-biden/
[https://perma.cc/U9JA-CSDY] (“Beyond reasserting the agency’s role as the federal cop on
the consumer beat, the Biden-era CFPB is set to psuh a number of rule changes to retighten
screws on corporate interests.”).
149. CHRISTOPHER L. PETERSON, CONSUMER FED’N OF AM., DORMANT: THE CONSUMER
FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU’S LAW ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM IN DECLINE 2 (2019),
https://consumerfed.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/CFPB-Enforcement-in-Decline.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5FS8-V7FS].
150.
Enforcement
Actions,
CONSUMER
FIN.
PROT.
BUREAU,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/actions/?title=&from_date=01%2F01%2F2
019&to_date=12%2F30%2F2019 [https://perma.cc/B855-HTDP] (last visited Dec. 10,
2020).
151. PETERSON, supra note 149, at 2.
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sharply declined during the Trump Administration.152 Many have
predicted that a Biden-appointed CFPB Director will not only reverse
these trends, but also could increase attention to fair-lending issues in an
effort to combat discrimination and promote racial equity causes,153 and
could enact stricter rules surrounding account overdraft fees, which
generated over $17 billion in revenue for banks in 2019. 154
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER FINANCIAL REGULATORY AGENCIES
A.

FHFA Director

The Seila Law majority denounced the CFPB’s structure as
“almost wholly unprecedented”155 and “an innovation with no foothold
in history or tradition.”156 According to Chief Justice Roberts, “[a]fter
years of litigating the agency’s constitutionality,” only four examples of
for-cause removal protection granted “to principal officers who wield
power alone rather than as members of a board or commission” could be
identified.157 The Court distinguished those agency leadership positions
152. Id. at 2–3.
153. See Kate Berry, Acting CFPB Chief Signals Tougher Stance Against Redlining, AM.

BANKER (Feb. 3, 2021, 9:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/acting-cfpb-chiefsignals-tougher-stance-against-redlining
[https://perma.cc/7W3P-3XH4]
(“Banking
attorneys are bracing for an immediate sea change in the [CFPB’s] approach to fair-lending
cases even before the Biden administration’s nominee to run the agency is confirmed.”).
154. See Schmidt & Hamilton, supra note 146 (“Wall Street is also expecting the regulator
to review the controversial, though lucrative, practice of overdraft fees.”); see also COREY
STONE
ET
AL.,
OLIVER
WYMAN,
BEYOND
OVERDRAFT
5
(2020),
https://www.oliverwyman.com/content/dam/oliverwyman/v2/publications/2020/jul/Beyond-Overdraft-Report-Finalpdf.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SNF2-BFZ2] (“In 2019, consumer overdraft-related fees generated $17
billion of revunes for the [banking] industry and represented 66 percent of consumer depositrelated fees for the nation’s largest banks . . . .”); PETER SMITH ET AL., CENTER FOR
RESPONSIBLE
LENDING,
OVERDRAFT
FEES
1
(2020),
https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/research-publication/crloverdraft-covid19-jun2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9NF-CBNE] (“[B]anks with assets of $1
billion or more charged customers $11.68 billion in overdraft-related fees” in 2019,
representing “an increase of $130 million over the 2018 total.”).
155. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2201 (2020).
156. Id. at 2202.
157. Id. at 2201. First, the Comptroller of the Currency was protected by a for-cause
removal limitation “for one year during the Civil War. That example has rightly been
dismissed as an aberration.” Id. Today, the Comptroller serves a five-year term “unless
sooner removed by the President, upon reasons to be communicated by him to the Senate.”
12 U.S.C. § 2. After Seila Law, it is clear that under the OCC’s current structure, any President
“in a firing mood” may remove the comptroller at will. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2232 (Kagan,
J., dissenting). Second, the Office of the Special Counsel (“OSC”), a government entity

2021]

SEILA LAW AND THE CFPB

391

from the CFPB Director as “not involv[ing] regulatory or enforcement
authority remotely comparable to that exercised by the CFPB.”158
However, one of those four examples, in particular—the Director of the
Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”)—deserves a closer look in
the new post-Seila Law constitutional order.159
The FHFA was created by the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act (“HERA”)160 in response to the 2008 financial crisis.161 An
independent executive agency,162 the FHFA regulates the Federal
National Mortgage Association (“Fannie Mae”) and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation (“Freddie Mac”), government-sponsored
entities (“GSEs”) specifically enumerated by statute. 163 Like the CFPB,
the FHFA is led by a single director who is appointed to a five-year term
by the President, subject to Senate confirmation, and can only be removed
by the President “for cause.”164 Also similar to the CFPB, the FHFA is
not funded via congressional appropriation, but through “annual
assessments” collected from Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in the course

separate from the Independent Counsel at issue in Morrison, has been led by a single director
with for-cause removal protection since 1978. Id. at 2201. Roberts dismissed a comparison
to the CFPB Director because “the OSC exercises only limited jurisdiction to enforce certain
rules governing Federal Government employers and employees,” and “does not bind private
parties at all or wield regulatory authority comparable to the CFPB.” Id. at 2202. Third, the
Social Security Administration (“SSA”) has been headed by a single Administrator since
1994, yet “unlike the CFPB, the SSA lacks the authority to bring enforcement actions against
private parties” and “is largely limited to adjudicating claims for Social Security benefits.”
Id. The FHFA was the fourth example identified by the Court. Id.
158. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2202.
159. Id.
160. Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (“HERA”), Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122
Stat. 2654.
161. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2202.
162. HERA § 1101, 12 U.S.C. § 4511(a) (“There is established the Federal Housing
Finance Agency, which shall be an independent agency of the Federal Government.”); see
also 44 U.S.C. § 3502(5) (including the FHFA in a list of “independent regulatory
agenc[ies]”).
163. HERA § 1101, 12 U.S.C. § 4511(b)(1)–(2). Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are
classified as “regulated entit[ies]” subject to the FHFA Director’s “general regulatory
authority” as set forth in the HERA. Id.
164. Id. § 4512(b)(1)–(2). The statutory language of the FHFA Director’s for-cause
removal protection is less specific than was the CFPB Director’s removal protection.
Compare id. § 4512(b)(2) (“The [FHFA] Director shall be appointed for a term of 5 years,
unless removed before the end of such term for cause by the President.”), with Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1011, 12 U.S.C. §
5491(c)(3) (allowing the President to remove the CFPB Director only “for inefficiency,
neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office”).
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of the agency’s supervisory activities.165 The FHFA is “advise[d]” by the
Federal Housing Finance Oversight Board, composed of the FHFA
Director, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Housing and
Urban Development, and the SEC Chairman.166 This Board is
distinguishable from the multimember commissions that lead the Federal
Reserve, the SEC, and other agencies, as the Board has no binding
authority over the FHFA or its Director.167
The FHFA Director also possesses regulatory and enforcement
powers.168 The FHFA Director is instructed to “issue any regulations,
guidelines, or orders necessary” to ensure the safety and soundness of
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.169 The Director may bring enforcement
actions against “a regulated entity or any entity-affiliated party” for any
“unsafe or unsound practice” or violations of law.170 The FHFA Director
may issue subpoenas and cease-and-desist orders,171 require Fannie Mae
or Freddie Mac to take remedial action,172 and impose civil penalties on
regulated entities of up to $2 million per day for each day that a violation
continues.173 However, unlike the CFPB, the FHFA may only regulate
the GSEs specifically enumerated in the HERA; the agency has no
authority over private parties or the housing and mortgage markets. 174
The Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, ruled in 2019 in Collins v.
Mnuchin175 that the FHFA Director’s for-cause removal protection was

165. HERA § 1106, 12 U.S.C. § 4516.
166. HERA § 1103, 12 U.S.C. § 4513a(a), (c).
167. See id. § 4513a(b) (the Board “may not exercise any executive authority, and the

Director may not delegate to the Board any of the functions, powers, or duties of the
Director”); see also Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553, 565 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc)
(describing the Board’s power as “Lilliputian”).
168. See infra nn. 169–74.
169. HERA § 1107, 12 U.S.C. § 4526(a); see also HERA § 1103 § 4513(a)(1)(A)–(B)
(“The principal duties of the Director shall be (A) to oversee the prudential operations of each
regulated entity; and (B) to ensure that each regulated entity operates in a safe and sound
manner” and that “the operations and activities of each regulated entity foster liquid, efficient,
competitive, and resilient national housing finance markets . . .”).
170. HERA § 1151, 12 U.S.C. § 4631(a)(1). The FHFA Director may bring charges for
“unsafe or unsound practice” if either Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac “receives . . . a less-thansatisfactory rating for asset quality, management, earnings or liquidity.” Id. at § 4631(b).
171. HERA § 1158, 12 U.S.C. § 4641 (subpoena authority); HERA § 1151, 12 U.S.C. §
4631 (cease-and-desist proceedings); HERA § 1152, 12 U.S.C. § 4632 (temporary cease-anddesist orders).
172. HERA § 1151, 12 U.S.C. § 4631(d).
173. HERA § 1155, 12 U.S.C. § 4636(b)(4).
174. HERA § 1154, 12 U.S.C. § 4635; HERA § 1155, 12 U.S.C. § 4636.
175. Collins v. Mnuchin, 938 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
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unconstitutional.176 That suit was brought by three Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac shareholders challenging the FHFA’s 2012 financing
agreement (referred to as the “Net Worth Sweep”) 177 as unconstitutional
in part because the agreement was adopted by a Director not removable
by the President at will—an argument accepted by the Fifth Circuit.178
The Fifth Circuit also found the Director’s removal protection provision
severable from HERA, noting that while the statute does not contain an
express severability clause, “nothing in the statutory scheme suggests that
Congress would prefer a complete unwind of actions taken by the FHFA
to an FHFA director removable at will.”179
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on July 9, 2020, and will
hear the case in the 2020-21 term.180 In Seila Law, Roberts appeared to
set the table for a similar ruling on the FHFA’s structure as the Court
delivered to the CFPB.181 The Chief Justice described the FHFA as
“essentially a companion of the CFPB, established in response to the
same financial crisis,” and, citing the Fifth Circuit’s Collins ruling, noted
that the FHFA’s structure is a “source of ongoing controversy.” 182 While
Roberts did concede that the FHFA “regulates primarily Governmentsponsored enterprises, not purely private actors [as does the CFPB],”183
the Court will likely set aside this difference and agree with the Fifth
Circuit’s reasoning because the fundamental constitutional defect—a

176. Id. at 563.
177. Id. at 567–68. The Net Worth Sweep “replaced the quarterly 10% dividend [paid to

Fannie and Freddie shareholders] with variable dividends equal to the GSEs’ entire net worth
except a capital reserve.” Id. at 567. This arrangement “transferred a fortune from Fannie
and Freddie to Treasury. When this suit was filed, the GSEs had paid $195 billion in
dividends under the net worth sweep.” Id. at 568.
178. Id. at 591 (“Agencies with removal-protected principal officers were a unique, but
recognized, blend of legislative, executive, and judicial powers long before the FHFA. Their
unique position has also been relatively static, until recently. The removal-protected FHFA
Director is a new innovation and falls outside the lines that Humphrey’s Executor recognized.
Granting both removal protection and full agency leadership to a single FHFA Director
stretches the independent-agency pattern beyond what the Constitution allows.”).
179. Id. at 592 (“When addressing the partial unconstitutionality of a statute such as this
one, we seek to honor Congress’ intent while fixing the problematic aspects of the statute.
Thus, in this case, the appropriate—and most judicially conservative—remedy is to sever the
‘for cause’ restriction on removal of the FHFA director from the statute.” (citations omitted)).
180. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Collins v. Mnuchin, No. 19-563, (U.S. Sept. 25,
2019).
181. See Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2202 (2020) (comparing the FHFA to
the CFPB).
182. Id.
183. Id.
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Director of an independent executive agency insulated from the
President’s at-will removal power—is the same defect that was removed
from the CFPB’s structure in Seila Law.184
However, the Court’s decision to hear Collins in light of these
similarities between the CFPB and FHFA Directorships begs the question
of why the Court granted certiorari and did not simply endorse the Fifth
Circuit’s holding as to the unconstitutionality of the FHFA Director’s
removal protection.185 At oral argument, Justice Sotomayor explored the
idea that the FHFA could be distinguished from the CFBP on grounds
related to the FHFA’s conservatorship powers, which she argued have
“historically been considered an adjunct to the judicial power,” rather
than an executive power that may only be exercised by a Director
removable at will by the President in light of Seila Law.186 However,
Justices Alito and Kagan appeared to reject this idea, agreeing with the
government’s position that the FHFA Director’s authority to place Fannie
and Freddie under conservatorship is an executive power and noting that
those GSEs have a “profound effect” on the nation’s housing market.187
Additionally, several Justices expressed significant hesitancy
towards the shareholders’ argument that if the FHFA Director is indeed
unconstitutionally insulated from the President’s removal power, the
Court should in turn invalidate the FHFA’s Net Worth Sweep.188 This
hesitancy seems grounded in the fact that the FHFA and Treasury
Department’s Net Worth Sweep resulted in an “astonishing windfall of
$124 billion” in profit for the federal government. 189 At oral argument,
several Justices questioned whether the Court should even reach the
constitutional issue of the FHFA Director’s removal protection, focusing
instead on the fact that the Net Worth Sweep at issue was first enacted by
an acting director removable at will, as well as underlying corporate law
issues at play.190 Given the nature of the Justices’ questions and the sheer
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Oral Argument at 18:30, Collins v. Mnuchin, Nos. 19-422 & 19-563 (U.S. argued

Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-422 [https://perma.cc/LCE4-4KLA].
187. Id. at 42:21.
188. Id. at 01:03:27.
189. Brief of Patrick J. Collins, et al., at 2, Collins v. Mnuchin, Nos. 19-422 & 19-563
(U.S. Sept. 16, 2020), 2020 WL 5731206, at *2.
190. Oral Argument at 5:30, Collins v. Mnuchin, Nos. 19-422 & 19-563 (U.S. argued Dec.
9, 2020) https://www.oyez.org/cases/2020/19-422 [https://perma.cc/LCE4-4KLA] (Justice
Thomas questioning counsel for the FHFA on the merits of the government’s business
judgement arguments and the issue of whether the plaintiffs’ claims were derivate or direct);
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magnitude of the final agency action at issue, the Court will perhaps use
Collins to address the thorny issues surrounding an acting director’s
actions as the leader of an independent executive agency, as well as an
independent agency’s ratification of an unconstitutionally-insulated
director’s actions.191
B.

Financial Regulatory Agencies Led by Multimember Boards or
Commissions

While the CFPB and FHFA are each led by a single director that
must be removable at will after Seila Law, the other federal financial
regulators do not suffer from the same constitutional defect. The Federal
Reserve, 192 FDIC,193 SEC,194 CFTC,195 and the National Credit Union
id. at 25:45 (Justice Kavanaugh questioning Aaron Nielson, Court-appointed amicus on behalf
of the FHFA, on the acting Director issue).
191. See Hannah Lang, Supreme Court Hints FHFA’s Calabria Could Keep Job After All,
AM. BANKER (Dec. 9, 2020, 4:48 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/supremecourt-hints-fhfas-calabria-could-keep-job-after-all [https://perma.cc/YC3N-WVYK] (noting
that the Court “appeared much more focused on the legality of the net worth sweep than the
constitutionality of the [FHFA’s] structure,” but appeared divided on “whether they should
apply the Seila Law ruling about the CFPB equally to the FHFA case”); see also Amy Howe,
Argument Analysis: “Very Hard Questions” in Dispute Over Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac
Shareholder
Suit,
SCOTUSBLOG
(Dec.
9,
2020,
7:05
PM),
https://www.scotusblog.com/2020/12/argument-analysis-very-hard-questions-in-disputeover-fannie-mae-freddie-mac-shareholder-suit/ [https://perma.cc/T83N-TNK2] (“If the
justices do conclude that the restrictions on the removal of the FHFA director violate the
Constitution, they will have to decide what remedy, if any, should be available for that
violation. . . . Some justices were clearly concerned that striking down the removal restrictions
could have significant and undesirable ripple effects—calling into question, for example, the
validity of the Social Security Administration’s leadership structure.”).
192. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (“Federal Reserve Board”) is
composed of seven members, appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, that
serve fourteen-year terms. 12 U.S.C. § 241. The Chairman is selected by the President from
the Federal Reserve Board and is nominated (subject to Senate confirmation) to serve a fouryear term. Id. § 242.
193. The FDIC is led by a five-member board, which includes the CFPB Director and the
Comptroller of the Currency; each member of the board is appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate to a six-year term. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1), (c)(1). The FDIC
Chairperson is selected from that group by the President and confirmed by the Senate to a
five-year term. Id. § 1812(b)(1).
194. The SEC is led by five Commissioners appointed by the President and confirmed by
the Senate to five-year terms. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a). The SEC Chairman is selected by the
President from the five Commissioners. Id.
195. The CFTC is also led by five Commissioners appointed by the President and
confirmed by the Senate to five-year terms. 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A). The CFTC Chairman is
appointed by the President from the five Commissioners; the appointment is subject to Senate
confirmation. Id. § 2(a)(2)(B).
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Association (“NCUA”)196 are all led by multimember boards or
commissions headed by a chair.197 With the exception of the Federal
Reserve, all of those agencies’ leadership committees are required by
statute to be composed of members of both political parties.198 The
Federal Reserve is also exceptional in that Federal Reserve Board
members serve their terms “unless sooner removed for cause by the
President.”199 The statutes that delegate authority to the FDIC, the SEC,
the CFTC, and the NCUA are silent on whether the President possesses
at will removal power over the Commissioners or Board members of
those agencies.200
Although the Seila Law Court was not specifically asked to reach
the issue of whether the members of such multimember commissions can
continue to enjoy for-cause removal protections, Chief Justice Roberts,
writing for the separate majority with respect to the severability issue, 201
indicated that such protections are distinguishable from the CFPB’s
single-Director structure and are thus constitutional.202 According to
Roberts, the Court’s decision to remove the CFPB Director’s for-cause
removal protection “does not foreclose Congress from pursuing
alternative responses to the problem—for example, converting the CFPB
into a multimember agency.”203 The Court apparently believes that a
multimember commission with for-cause removal protection is
permissible because a multimember structure diffuses authority, rather
196. The NCUA is led by a three-member Board; each Board member is appointed by the
President to a six-year term, subject to Senate confirmation. 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b), (c). The
President designates the Chairman of the Board. Id. § 1752a(b).
197. HENRY B. HOGUE ET AL., INDEPENDENCE OF FEDERAL FINANCIAL R EGULATORS 10 tbl.2,
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43391.pdf [https://perma.cc/U9Y7-8PPM] (listing the federal
financial regulatory agencies and a description of each agency’s leadership structure).
198. HOGUE ET AL., supra note 168, at 1. No more than three members of the five-member
FDIC Board of Directors may be of the same political party. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(2). The
same is true of the SEC Commissioners, 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a), and CFTC Commissioners, 7
U.S.C. § 2(a)(2)(A). No more than two members of the NCUA Board may be of the same
party affiliation. 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(b)(1).
199. 12 U.S.C. § 242.
200. See 12 U.S.C. § 1812 (FDIC); 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (SEC); 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2) (CFTC);
and 12 U.S.C. § 1752a(c) (NCUA).
201. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2207–11 (2020). Of the Justices comprising
the other sections of the Seila Law majority opinion, only Justices Alito and Kavanaugh joined
Chief Justice Roberts’ severability analysis; Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, and Sotomayor, also concurred in the judgement with respect to the severability issue.
Id.
202. Id. at 2209.
203. Id. at 2211.
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than concentrate it in a single director, thus making it more difficult for
that authority to be abused and less likely that an independent agency will
“slip” from the President’s control and impinge the “liberty” of the
American people.204 However, the Court provided no further support for
that argument beyond denouncing the CFPB Director’s lack of
“colleagues to persuade,”205 an omission with which the dissent found
particularly troubling.206 Regardless of the merits of the Court’s
reasoning, it is clear that at least for now, multimember commissions that
lead independent agencies can continue to be insulated from the
President’s at-will removal power.
C.

FDIC, FSOC, and Legislative Reforms

Seila Law also increases the President’s control over the FDIC
and the FSOC.207 The FDIC’s five-member board includes the CFPB
Director, the Comptroller of the Currency, and three other members
appointed by the President.208 After Seila Law, the President will no
longer have to wait for the natural expiration of an inherited CFPB
Director’s term before selecting a new Director; the President could exert
greater influence over FDIC policy by installing a CFPB Director who
shares the President’s policy goals, and by removing the Director at any
time if he or she deviates from those goals.209 Similarly, the President
204. Id. passim.
205. Id. at 2204.
206. According to Justice Kagan, “[t]he purported constitutional problem here is that an

official has ‘slip[ped] from the Executive’s control’ and ‘supervision’—that he has been
unaccountable to the President. . . . So to make sense on the majority’s own terms, the
distinction between singular and plural agency heads must rest on a theory about why the
former more easily ‘slip’ from the President’s grasp. But the majority has nothing to offer. .
. . If the Court is going to invalidate statutes based on empirical assertions like this one, it
should offer some empirical support. It should not pretend that its assessment that the CFPB
wields more power more dangerously than the SEC comes from someplace in the
Constitution. But today the majority fails to accord even that minimal respect to Congress.”
Id. at 2242–44 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Justice Kagan asserted
instead that “[m]ore powerful control mechanisms are needed (if anything) for commissions.
Holding everything else equal, those are the agencies more likely to ‘slip from the Executive’s
control.’ . . . A multimember structure reduces accountability to the President because it’s
harder for him to oversee, to influence—or to remove, if necessary—a group of five or more
commissioners than a single director. Indeed, that is why Congress so often resorts to hydraheaded agencies.” Id. at 2243 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
207. See Phillips, supra note 7 (“After Seila Law, a majority of FDIC board members will
always be of the president’s party.”).
208. 12 U.S.C. § 1812(a)(1).
209. Seila Law, 140 S. Ct. at 2209.
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now possesses at-will removal power over nine of the ten voting members
of the FSOC—which includes both the CFPB and FHFA Directors—the
exception being the Chairman of the Federal Reserve.210 This could also
potentially provide the President increased control over the FSOC’s
decision-making.211
Finally, it is worth noting several bills have recently been
introduced to Congress in attempts to reform the CFPB, FHFA, and other
regulatory agencies.212 In June 2019, Republican Senators Mike Lee and
Josh Hawley introduced the “Take Care Act”213 to eliminate all for-cause
removal protections for federal executive branch officers. 214 While Seila
Law has now made the CFPB Director removable at will, Congress could
potentially eliminate all for-cause removal protections for executive
officers via legislation like the proposed “Take Care Act.” In September
2020, in another effort to limit the power of the CFPB and FHFA
Directors, Representatives Brenda Lawrence and Jody Hice introduced
the “GAO Mandates Revision Act”215 that would somewhat curtail the
independence of the CFPB’s and FHFA’s funding arrangements by
subjecting the CFPB and FHFA to annual audits by Congress and the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget. 216
210. The ten voting members of the FSOC are the Secretary of the Treasury, who serves
as the Chairperson of the FSOC; the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board; the Comptroller
of the Currency; the CFPB Director; the SEC Chairman; the FDIC Chairperson; the CFTC
Chairperson; the FHFA Director; the Chairman of the NCUA Board; and “an independent
member appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, having
insurance expertise.” Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”) § 111, 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(1).
211. Id.
212. See infra nn.210–13.
213. Take Care Act, S. 1753, 116th Cong. (2019). The bill’s stated purpose is “[t]o promote
accountability and effective administration in the execution of laws by restoring the original
understanding of the President’s constitutional power to remove subordinates from office.”
Id.
214. Senator Lee remarked: “President Trump was famous for many things even before he
was elected. One of those things was the catch-phrase ‘You’re fired,’ which he popularized
on his reality TV show ‘The Apprentice.’ . . . the head of an organization must always have
hanging in reserve, sort of like an employer Damoclean sword—the absolute right to
terminate a subordinate. . . . The bill would restore the unitary executive envisioned by the
Founders and, in fact, required by the Constitution by stripping away all existing for-cause
removal protections from the so-called independent agencies.” 165 CONG. REC. S3259–60
(daily ed. June 5, 2019) (statement of Sen. Mike Lee).
215. GAO Mandates Revision Act, H.R. 8241, 116th Cong. (2020).
216. The CFPB is currently subject annually to both an independent external audit and a
Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) audit conducted by the Comptroller General.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1017, 12
U.S.C. § 5496a. The GAO Mandates Revision Act would remove the GAO audit
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VII. CONCLUSION
After years of litigation and political quarrelling, the CFPB
Director’s for-cause removal protection was finally severed from the
Dodd Frank Act in Seila Law, and the case will likely cement the same
outcome for the FHFA.217 However, the Court’s decision also affirms the
constitutionality of the Bureau’s existence and leaves its regulatory
powers, enforcement actions, and funding arrangement untouched.218
Seila Law ultimately increases the President’s control over the CFPB and
the federal financial regulatory framework generally, but the decision will
have little impact on the CFPB’s past and pending operations. 219 As for
the agency’s future operations, President Biden will likely wield this new
removal authority to nominate a CFPB Director who will return the
Bureau to the levels of regulatory and enforcement activities seen under
President Obama and Director Cordray.220 Despite Congress’ attempt to
insulate the CFPB from volatile political winds, Seila Law has pushed the
Bureau further into the storm of Presidential politics.
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requirement; in addition to the independent external audit, the CFPB would be required to
“prepare and submit” an annual audit to both Congress and the Director of the Office of
Management and Budget. H.R. 8241, § 2. The same is true for the FHFA. Id.; see also 12
U.S.C. § 4516(h) (current annual audit requirements for the FHFA).
217. Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2211 (2020).
218. Id. at 2209.
219. See CFPB v. Seila Law LLC, 984 F.3d 715, 718–20 (9th Cir. 2020) (holding the
CFPB’s past regulatory and pending enforcement actions were sufficiently ratified after the
Supreme Court severed the Director’s for-cause removal protection provision).
220. Ackerman & Restuccia, supra note 145; PETERSON, supra note 149.
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